Je voudrais examiner et critiquer un argument en faveur de la contraception qui prétend s'appuyer sur des raisons personnalistes. On pourrait le résumer ainsi: l'acte conjugal a deux fonctions, l'une biologique ou procréatrice, l'autre spirituelle et unitive. Mais alors que l'acte n'est procréateur qu'en puissance, il est toujours en lui-même un acte d'amour qui exprime réellement l'amour conjugal et unit les époux. C'est pourquoi, bien que la contraception élimine la potentialité biologique ou procréatrice de l'acte conjugal, elle respecte pleinement sa fonction spirituelle et unitive; plus encore, elle la facilite, puisqu'elle élimine les t
I. La contracepcion y la union marital
There is a modern argument for conjugal contraception which claims to speak in personalist terms, and which could be summarised as follows. The marriage act has two functions: a biological or procreative function, and a spiritual-unitive function. However, while it is only potentially a procreative act, it is actually and in itself a love act: it truly expresses conjugal love and unites husband and wife. Now, while contraception frustrates the biological or procreative potential of the marital act, it fully respects its spiritual and unitive function; in fact it facilitates it by removing tensions or fears capable of impairing the expression of love in married intercourse. In other words - this position claims - while contraception suspends or nullifies the procreative aspect of marital intercourse, it leaves its unitive aspect intact.
Your issue of March 1 has just reached me in Rome. Louise Ni Chríodáin, in her article on High Court Judge Rory O'Hanlon, quotes me as "condemning all acts of sexual intercourse that are not for procreation".
In protesting and totally rejecting this, may I say that one would expect a more exact reading of the sources before being accused of a position that no one in the Catholic Church holds.