Dialog with an Atheist: Indissolubility of Marriage

[What follows could be considered a typical example of an inconclusive dialog; yet it may be of interest to some readers]


From: ***. To: cburke@strathmore.ac.ke

Subject: Exclusion of indissolubility of marriage

19 June 2008

Dear Msgr. Burke,

I am writing to request your comments regarding the exclusion of indissolubility of marriage.

I am an atheist (baptized in the Roman Catholic Church) involved in a somewhat complicated relationship with a devout Roman Catholic woman. We have known each other for 15 years and would like to be together, however she insists on a Catholic marriage. Of course I could simply find a priest who will not ask me any uncomfortable questions or pretend that I have not stopped believing; however, I have decided to take the matter seriously and investigate whether I am actually able to contract a valid Catholic marriage.

Challenges to Matrimonial Jurisprudence posed by the 1983 Code (Studia canonica, 41 (2007), pp. 441-452)

Dans cet article, l’auteur, ancien auditeur à la Rote romaine, réfléchit sur les aspects innovateurs et audacieux du Code de 1983 et plus spécialement en ce qui concerne la jurisprudence en matière de consentement matrimonial. L’auteur offre quelques brefs commentaires sur le canon 1095 pour lequel il croit que le canon résulte largement du développement logique de la jurisprudence rotale des années 50, 60 et 70. Ce dernier canon prend les existants motifs de démence (amentia) et autres troubles psychiques sérieux et les incopore dans une définition plus large d’incapacité juridique due à une grave deficience psychique.

The Object of Matrimonial Consent: A Personalist Analysis

The Object of Matrimonial Consent: A Personalist Analysis
[original Italian: L'Oggetto del Consenso Matrimoniale: un'analisi personalistica, Giappichelli, Torino, 1997. This version published in Forum 9 (1998)1: pp. 39-117]

I. Matrimonial Consent and Christian Personalism

Progressive jurisprudential thinking (The Jurist 58 (1998:2), pp. 437-478)

Progress in juridic science

            Juridic science must progress, just as any other science. Otherwise it stagnates and loses vitality. By means of continuous reflection it needs to seek deeper insights on major questions that have always been at its very basis, such as the relation of truth and justice; or on the juridic treatment to be given to what may be considered new but are certainly not secondary themes, such as the definition and legal protection of human rights; or again on lesser but still important topics, such as the way of accelerating legal procedures without violation of due process or detriment to justice.

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